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Abstract 
 
This bachelor’s thesis builds on the phenomenon of disruptive innovation and the business philosophy 
of market orientation. More specifically, it strives to study how market orientation could help incum-
bent companies to defend against disruptive innovations (i.e. avoid losing market share disruptive 
competitors). The main research methods are literature reviews as well as qualitative meta-analysis, 
which both help in the definition and discussion of the relevant concepts, such as market orientation 
and disruptive innovation. Based on the literature of innovation management and management practice 
research streams I identified four components which are crucial to incumbent’s defense against dis-
ruptive innovations: (1) early recognition of potential disruptions, (2) response strategy formulation, 
(3) response strategy implementation, (4) innovation ability. Subsequently, these items are cross ana-
lyzed with the existing literature of marketing orientation, resulting in a confirmation of marketing 
orientation’s positive effect on three of the components, namely 1, 3, and 4. The findings are signifi-
cant, as they open a novel instance of market orientation’s indirect performance benefits. In addition, 
the thesis contributed to the disruptive innovation research by suggesting a broader approach to dis-
ruptive innovation responding. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The research at hand builds on the phenomenon of disruptive innovation (DI) and the business philos-
ophy of market orientation (MO). More specifically, it centers on how MO could help incumbent 
companies to defend against DIs (i.e. avoid losing market share disruptive competitors). 
  
Today’s world is developing faster than ever and just in the last decade we have seen the mobile, as 
well as the social media revolution. Examples like Facebook and Airbnb, have made traditional com-
panies vigilant with their fast market entries and steep growth curves. Accompanied by new products, 
services, and business models, come also changes in consumer behavior (Paap & Katz, 2004).  
 
All new product, service, process or business model introductions naturally are not DIs. Some can be 
barely called innovations, some are sustaining (ie. incremental), some disruptive, and some are radical 
(Schmidt & Druel, 2008). As stated earlier, this research focuses on DIs. I chose to study DIs because 
of two reasons: first, there are already well-researched best practices in place for forecasting and eval-
uating sustaining innovations (Meade & Islam, 2006). Second, radical innovations are generally close 
to impossible to prepare for, as they generally are the result of extensive investments combined with 
luck  – resulting in extensive improvement of given performance metrics (Govindarajan, Kopalle, 
Danneels, 2011). DIs, however usually emerge slowly from the remote markets without warnings and 
require no large scale investments (e.g. Christensen 1995; 2003). In addition they have been proven to 
be forecastable (Govindarajan and Kopalle 2006), thus, making them also manageable. In short: busi-
nesses already know how to manage sustaining innovations, have very limited possibilities to defend 
against radical innovations, but can learn how to defend against DIs. 
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Some business orientations enable companies to defend against DIs better than others. Out of the nu-
merous business approaches, MO provides an interesting candidate. I arrived to this conclusion by 
comparing the definitions(s) of MO and the inherent characteristics DIs have. Majority of the field 
seems to agree that market intelligence generation, dissemination and operationalization, with the ob-
jective to create customer value are central in elements of MO (Raaij & Stoelhorst 2008; Lafferty & 
Hult, 2001). Especially market intelligence generation and customer value creation are actions aiming 
to discern emerging competitors and/or consumer behavior patterns, which essentially open the road 
for DIs (Christensen 2015). Thus, MO and DI their crossroad form the base of my thesis. 
 
Furthermore, while DIs and MO have both been extensively researched and contributed to by the ac-
ademia since the 1990s (for an overview, see Liao, Chang, Wu & Katrichis, 2011; Yu & Hang, 2010), 
there has not been much research on their relationship. From the research stream of DI Gans (2016) 
and Charitou and Markides (2002) are one of the few to have shed light on how incumbents should 
response to DIs, but they do not take MO into account. From the MO research stream Huhtala, Sihvo-
nen, Frösén, Jaakkola, and Tikkanen, (2014) and Govindarajan et. al. (2011) have studied the interface, 
but they only focus on MO’s effect on firm’s innovation capability. Thus, a more comprehensive take 
on MO’s potential effect on the Incumbet defense capabilities against DIs is well in place.  
 
1.1 Research objective and research questions 
 
The objective of the research is to specify the role of MO in defending against DIs by reviewing the 
relevant literature in both, the MO and DI research streams. This action will provide the answers to 
research questions (1) “What are Disruptive Innovations”, and (2) “What is Market Orientation?” Sub-
sequently, attributes that are addressable to MO and which might prove to have an effect on defending 
against DIs are mined out and listed. This in turn, will help to formulate the answer to the research 
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questions (3), “What are the ways by which MO could help incumbent companies to defend against 
DIs?”, 
  
Then, at the crossroad of the research areas of MO and DI a qualitative meta-analysis will be performed 
on the literature. The meta-analysis will provide answers to the research question (4) “What is the 
assumed nature (positive, neutral, or negative) of MO’s effects to incumbent firm’s defense capability 
against DIs. The findings of this analysis should be divided to theoretical and practical implication. 
The practical implications of the research shed light on the current best practices of market orientation 
in the successful defense against DI and disruptive environments. The theoretical implications in turn, 
broaden the understanding of the performance implications cause by MO, and also offer a potential 
base for future, empirical academic research, which are needed to further verify the findings of this 
research. 
 
2. Disruptive Innovation – definition & discussion 
 
The concept of disruptive innovation (DI) was first introduced to the world by Clayton Christensen 
and Joseph Bower in their paper “Disruptive technologies: catching the wave” in 1995 (Christensen 
et. al. 2015). Originally Christensen and Bower (1995) named the phenomenon as ‘disruptive technol-
ogy’, defining the concept to encompass only technological innovations. However, after further re-
search on the subject and refinement of the theory in his two books (Christensen 1997; Christensen 
and Raynor 2003), Christensen and Raynor (2003) ultimately widened the definition to include also 
business model and product innovations and gave the concept its present name, ‘disruptive innovation’. 
 
Disruptive innovation, as a term, can be dangerously misleading - especially for those unfamiliar with 
the field’s academic literature. Due to the recent increase in the interest towards the phenomenon and 
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the accompanied indefinite usage of the term, DI is often falsely associated with all kinds of innova-
tions that lead to radical changes in a given industry (Christensen et. al. 2015). I argue that the problem 
lies in the wording of the term itself, as probably most of us, when facing the term the first time, 
understand it to describe innovations that are disruptive. However, in this academic setting, this is not 
necessarily always the case, and the correct processing would be to consider it as a single term with its 
own, defined, characteristics. Schmidt and Druehl (2008) encapsulate the term’s problematics ably: 
“A disruptive innovation (i.e., one that dramatically disrupts the current market) is not necessarily a 
disruptive innovation (as Clayton Christensen defines this term)” (p. 347).  
 
According to the most up to date definition of DI by Christensen et. al. (2015), (1) DIs emerge only in 
in low-end or new-market footholds. This means that DIs are initially adopted either by the less served 
and less demanding customers, or previous nonconsumers, which the DI turns to consumers. Moreo-
ver, (2) at the time of their emergence, DIs do not satisfy the needs of mainstream customers, and thus 
are not consumed by them. Only after DIs have developed the mainstream customers’ preferred qual-
ity, will they start to appeal to them. Below, Fig. 1 depicts the disruptive innovation model, where the 
red lines are product performance trajectories, which represent the development of products or ser-
vices. The blue lines are different customer segments’ willingness to pay for performance. The general 
process that leads to disrupted markets starts when incumbent companies improve their offering with 
continuous sustaining innovations, leading their products’ performance to float upwards toward the 
high-end market, while simultaneously overserving the needs of the mainstream and low end of the 
market. This creates a market hole for challengers at the lower end of the market, and the more they 
improve their products’ performance, the more they start to win the mainstream customers, ultimately 
challenging the incumbents. 
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Fig.1 From “What is disruptive innovation” Christensen et al., (2015) 
Although being the inventor of the term DI, and widely considered as a seminal character in the inno-
vation research academia, Christensen’s research has not always been accepted outright, and still up 
to this day it continues to inflict conversation (see Sampere, Bienenstock, Zuckerman, 2016; King & 
Baatartogtokh, 2015). Regarding different researchers’ stances on Christensen’s research, robust cat-
egorization leads to two groups: supporters and critics.  
 
Supporters hold Christensen’s DI theory (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003) as fully or 
at least principally correct. In addition, they also contribute to the literature by providing complemen-
tary models to the original theory, which help to further explain some inconsistencies left unaddressed 
in Christensen’s theory (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). One example of this group’s 
members are Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006), who introduce high-end disruptive innovations, as 
well as validate the theory’s ability to forecast which companies could potentially become disruptors. 
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Another noteworthy mention are Schmidt and Druehl (2008), who rigorously undergo several DI ex-
ample cases, including their relevant data, ultimately introducing a DI theory complementing en-
croachment terminology (see Appendix 2 for full list) (Yu & Hang, 2010).   
 
The critics on the other hand consider that there is something rather major incorrect or inaccurate in 
Christensen’s theory (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et. al., 2003), and often question its significance. 
Markides (2006) for example, unhappy about Christensen and Raynor’s (2003) disruptive technolo-
gies’ expansion to also consider business model and product innovations, calls for a much finer cate-
gorization of innovations, as “mixing apples with oranges” (p. 19) hampers the field’s development, 
as different type of innovations, despite some similarities, have different implications for practitioners. 
Also Danneels (2004) criticizes Christensen’s DI theory’s (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 
2003) definition of DI of being too broad and vague, as well as questions its ability to forecast DIs ex 
ante (i.e. before they happen). In addition Danneels (2004) suggested that perhaps the reason behind 
incumbent companies’ failure to respond DI was not of lacking technical capabilities, but rather lack-
ing marketing competence, as the incumbents generally could produce prototypes (i.e. master the tech-
nology) but failed to find the right customers or ways to market the new innovation to them. 
 
The earlier mentioned King and Baatartogtokh’s (2015) article in turn, questions in effect the whole 
DI theory’s (Christensen et al., 2015) validity. King and Baatartogtokh’s (2015) arguments are based 
on the notion that 79 interviewed experts could not link or identify 4 key specifications of DIs present 
at the very companies Christensen (1997) and Christensen et.al. (2003) had used as examples in their 
research. Given King and Baatartogtokh’s paper’s disposition, it is no miracle that a parry was due. 
Once the supporters gathered their ranks, the validity of King and Baatartogtokh’s method (i.e. expert 
interviews), as well as the 4 key areas of DI chosen by them, were questioned (Sampere et al., 2016). 
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Also one reason for the missing link between the companies and disruption in King and Baatar-
togtokh’s data could be that the companies initially affected by disruptive events could have found 
ways to avoid being disrupted (Gans, 2016). One of the three defender-debaters, Zuckerman (deputy 
dean & Alvin J. Sitema Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School), con-
cludes that “One hopes that in the future, the theory of disruptive innovation is recognized for what it 
is rather than promoted or attacked for what it is not” (Sampere et al., 2016, 3rd opinion piece). 
 
All stances and perspectives considered, my personal view is that despite Christensen’s DI theory 
probably not withstanding rigorous validation in all of its areas, in its core it is still a very useful theory 
to help understand the underlying “hidden” weaknesses of incumbent businesses against innovations 
which first seem as frivolous but later significantly grow in their ominousness.  
 
The different views of DI and the theory behind the term have now been defined and introduced by 
their relevant outlines. However in order to elucidate the phenomenon slightly further, in the following 
chapter I will present three business cases and review them through the lenses of DI. 
 
2.1 Examples of disruptive innovations  
 
In this chapter I will introduce two business cases, which embody the characteristics of some of the DI 
types described in the previous chapter, as well as one case where a company appears to be disruptive, 
but after a more careful inspection, surfaces as (radically) sustaining. 
 
The pattern of multiple DIs in the hard-disk-drive industry serves a classic example of the DI theory, 
as it was the first ever example of DI, introduced already in 1995 by Bower and Christensen. The 
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history of the hard-disk drive industry has several disruptions and coup d’état-like market share fluc-
tuations of which Bower and Christensen (1995) showcase the transitions from 14-inch to 8-inch to 
5,25-inch to 3,5-inch drives. In all of the cases, the leading industry players rejected the smaller drives, 
as they provided less storage capacity than the larger sized drives. The smaller drives however had 
other advantages, such as their smaller size, internal power supplies, light weight, and lower power 
consumptions. These new performance parameters opened the doors for the development of their end 
products, such as minicomputers, desktop PCs, and lastly portable computers. None of the smaller disk 
drives were especially hard to manufacture at their time, but they didn’t seem as good investments 
from the incumbent companies’ point of view, as the companies were mainly serving company cus-
tomers who didn’t have the need for smaller, portable or personal computer enabling drives at that 
moment (Bower and Christensen, 1995). 
 
A good example of a rarer case of DI are mobile phones at the time of their emergence. Mainstream 
customers were not interested in the product, because landline phones provided better coverage and 
lower cost. Therefore the first customer of mobile phones were corporate executives, who appreciated 
the mobility and were not as price sensitive. Only after mobile phones’ coverage was better and their 
cost lower, did the mainstream customers start to purchase them (Yu and Hang, 2010). Here the ini-
tially undervalued performance metric was mobility, whereas coverage and low price were the primary 
performance metrics. Depending from the point of view, the diffusion of mobile phones can be seen 
as high end infiltrating DI (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) – a perspective emphasizing product price, 
or from the customer needs viewpoint as detached-market low-end encroachment (Schmidt & Druehl, 
2008).  
 
A third example, the case of the (ac)claimed taxi industry disruptor Uber, brings forth the perils of 
perfunctory popularization of management science theories. As Christensen et. al. (2015) stated, the 
12 
 
DI term has been widely misused, and this is also often what happens when Uber is described. Uber 
has certainly transformed the taxi industry, but its service does not fulfill the definitions of DI. Chris-
tensen et. al. (2015) point out two mismatches of Uber and the DI definition. First, upon its emergence, 
Uber targeted mainstream taxi customers, not the low-end market (e.g. public transport users), nor did 
it create a new market; same customers are still purchasing a taxi drive from A to B, now just by phone. 
Second, DIs are initially considered inferior by the mainstream customers, but due to many factors, 
Uber’s service was considered as superior by the mainstream customers already during its emergence. 
Hence, being more sustaining than disruptive in its nature, Uber could be categorized as a radical 
business model innovation. 
 
2.2 Defending against Disruptive Innovations 
 
The previous section introduced two examples of the dissemination of various DIs. This section in turn 
discusses how the incumbent companies at the receiving end should operate in order to avoid being 
disrupted. The main purpose is to articulate the actions and processes required of incumbent companies 
to successfully manage potentially disruptive competition and markets. 
 
Literature from the management practice and innovation management research offers a myriad of var-
ious strategies which incumbents should follow and operationalize when they encounter a DI. However 
as logic demands, responding to something requires first being aware of it. Thus, an incumbent’s ac-
tions (or inactions) leading to the recognition of the DI must also be taken in to account. According to 
Danneels (2006), monitoring a company’s remote markets is crucial to recognize potential disruptions. 
Paap and Katz (2004) define two potential causes for disruption: remote customers with unserved 
needs, or competitors capable of awakening new needs (often with new technology or business-mod-
13 
 
els). Scanning the market environment for disruptors is especially important, as the earlier the threat-
ening DIs are discerned, the more room and affordable response options remain at the incumbents’ 
disposal (Markides 2002; Gans 2016). In addition, if the monitoring is very successful, the incumbents 
can even recognize and exploit disruptive technologies before the emergence of challengers (Paap & 
Katz, 2004). 
 
As mentioned before, the existing literature provides many approaches for businesses on how to re-
spond to DIs. However, no single approach rises above others in terms of (validated) performance. 
This is unsurprising, as finding the suitable response is highly dependent on multiple factors (e.g in-
cumbent capabilities, industry, characteristics of DI etc.), making generalization close to impossible. 
Hence, this chapter focuses on showcasing the different response possibilities. Bergek, Berggren, Mag-
nusson, and Hobday (2013) propose a creative accumulation approach based on their comprehensive 
analysis on the technological discontinuities in the auto and gas turbine industries. According to the 
authors, incumbents wishing to avoid disruption should simultaneously (1) develop their existing tech-
nologies, (2) acquire new resources or technologies, as well as (3) integrate the new and existing 
knowledge for the best possible offering. Charitou and Markides (2002) in turn suggest that an incum-
bent should reflect on its position and competences on the industry as well as the characteristics of the 
faced DI. Depending on these factors, the best strategy for an incumbent may range from ignoring the 
DI to disrupting the disruptor (for a full list of Charitou and Markides’ proposed strategies, see appen-
dix 4). On the other hand, in addition to the above, Gans (2016) suggests that incumbents have the 
option of acquiring or co-operating with the challengers. Moreover, in some cases, incumbents may 
possess certain assets that give them the luxury to delay or block the DIs access to the mainstream 
market (Gans, 2016). Lastly, Arend (2009) introduces actively pre-empting rival innovation defenses, 
of which some are rather questionable in nature, such as “[…] disrupting key points in the rival’s 
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innovative process in order to make success at each key point more costly, time-consuming, and frus-
trating than it would otherwise be.” (p. 199) (see full list of Arend’s innovation defenses in Appendix 
5). Disregarding moral questions and given that the local market legislation allows for these kind of 
actions, Arend’s (2009) suggestions might prove effective - though they still lack validation. 
 
A well formulated response strategy increases an incumbent’s chances for success, but the threat of 
disruption is still imminent. Strategies rarely are implemented exactly as they were planned, and the 
end result is always a sum of planned and unplanned emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 2003). In the 
case of DIs, or business strategies for that matter, well begun is not half done: “[…] doing is harder 
than dreaming, and a poorly executed strategy is merely a vision of what could be” (Olson, Slater, & 
Hult, 2005) (p. 47). Olson et. al. (2005) also discovered that the performance of different strategies is 
not dependent on specific organizational types, but rather than how well companies manage to align 
their policies, structures, and behavior with the chosen strategy. Thus it can be inferred that in addition 
to response strategy formulation, also the strategy’s successful implementation is crucial for deterring 
disruption.  
 
As the fourth focus point in the incumbent’s action list for successful defense against DIs, is innova-
tion. Good innovation capability is important, as it overall helps an incumbent’s position. For example, 
if an incumbent is innovative, it is also more likely to distinguish further (disruptive) innovations which 
it may then exploit or prepare against (Kandampully, 2002; Mumford, 2002). Also many of the re-
sponse strategies required either internal innovation, or at least integration of challenger’s innovations 
(e.g. Markides 2002; Gans, 2016). Moreover, the probability for disruption arguably is lower for an 
innovative company, as it has already probably commercialized a certain number of innovations, re-
quiring, on average, more effort from the challengers to invent new ones.  
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In conclusion, for incumbents to successfully defend against DIs, they have to (1) recognize the po-
tential disruptions, (2) formulate a suitable response strategy, (3) implement the response strategy, and 
lastly (4) be capable of innovation. 
 
The next section introduces market orientation, its two main perspectives, as well as the perspectives’ 
synthesis. The introduction of market orientation will serve as a basis for later discussion on its poten-
tial effects on the above listed four actions. 
 
3. Market orientation – definition 
 
MO has its roots in the business philosophy of marketing concept, which has played an important role 
as one of the foundations for modern marketing (Lafferty & Hult, 2001; Kirca et al., 2005). In fact, the 
research stream of MO started to bloom much due to Webster’s (1988) acclaimed paper, “The redis-
covery of the marketing concept” (Raaij & Stoelhorst, 2008). The marketing concept, in turn, is defined 
as a philosophy which “[marketing concept]… holds that the key to achieving organizational goals is 
being more effective than competitors in creating, delivering, and communicating superior customer 
value to your target markets” (Kotler & Keller, 2016, p. 42). Subsequently, MO is associated with the 
implementation or appearance of the marketing concept (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Lafferty & Hult, 
2001; Liao et al., 2011). MO can be essentially described as the scale of how much of the marketing 
concept is embodied in a given company or organization. 
 
The MO literature itself provides a “rich but fragmented picture of what market orientation is […]” 
(Raaij & Stoelhorst 2008 p. 3). This is naturally reflected as multiple and more focused definition(s) 
of MO from various perspectives. The most distinguished perspectives in the MO research stream, and 
under which most of the research falls into, are the (1) cultural perspective first introduced by Narver 
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and Slater (1990) and the (2) behavioral perspective by Kohli and Jaworski (1990). (See eg. Griffiths 
& Grover, 1998; Homburg & Pflesser, 2000; Kirca et al., 2005). The following subchapters, ,3.1 and 
3.2, will discuss these perspectives more in detail, while the third and last subchapter of the MO-
chapter will attempt to synthesize the common elements inherent in these perspectives. 
 
3.1 Cultural perspective  
 
The cultural perspective views MO as an organizational culture, which most effectively evokes the 
type of behavior required for the delivery of superior value to buyers, and therefore also increased 
business performance (eg. Deshpandé et al., 1993; Narver and Slater, 1990; Webster, 1988). Based on 
previous literature, Narver and Slater (1990) induced a framework (see Fig. 2 below) for cultural MO. 
According to them, “[…] market orientation consists of three behavioral components – customer ori-
entation, competitor orientation, and interfunctional coordination – and two decision criteria – long-
term focus and profitability” (Narver & Slater, 1990, p. 21).  
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Fig. 2 From “The effect of a market orientation on business profitability” (Narver & Slater, 1990) 
 
The first and perhaps the most intuitive component of the framework, customer orientation is described 
by Narver and Slater (1990) as the comprehensive understanding of the continuously evolving value 
chains of a business’s target buyers and their buyers to distinguish all the potential customers, as well 
their present and future needs. Competitor orientation in turn, much like customer orientation is de-
fined as understanding a company’s competitors, as well as potential future competitors short both 
long and long term weaknesses, strategies, and abilities (Narver & Slater, 1990). Lastly, Narver and 
Slater (1990) define interfunctional coordination as the integrated mustering of a company’s depart-
ments and resources for the creation of superior value to its target buyers. It is also worthwhile to note, 
that Narver and Slater’s (1990) research could not validate the long-term nor profit focus decision 
criteria’s congruence in their model. 
 
Other notable contributors in the cultural MO stream have also been Deshpandé et al. (1993), with 
their distinctive focus on the organizational culture aspect. Their research reveals that across industries, 
corporate cultures that are open and market oriented perform better than closed and internally oriented 
organizations (Deshpandé et al., 1993; Deshpandé & Farley, 2004). They define MO is a set of beliefs 
that primarily cater to the customer’s interest (while also taking other stakeholders into account) and 
also part of larger corporate culture (Deshpandé et al., 1993). It is also noteworthy to mention, that 
Deshpandé et al. (1993) discuss the term ‘customer orientation’, but mention to conceive it as a syno-
nym of the term MO. In his later research (although with a different assembly of scholars), Deshpandé 
had also switched to use the MO term, as well as to behavioral (re)definition of MO (Deshpandé & 
Farley, 1998).  
 
In addition, Homburg and Pflesser (2000) (citing Deshpandé et al. (1993), Narver and Slater 
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(1990), and Slater and Narver (1994)), make an interesting note that among the cultural perspective 
MO literature, behavioral traits have commonly been the main channel for measuring and understand-
ing MO. However, without questioning the validity of the statement in itself, the notion is inaccurate 
with respect to the research of Deshpande et al. (1993), for their research specifically addresses the 
elements of corporate culture, not behavior. This inaccuracy is also supported by Raaij & Stoelhorst, 
(2008): “All [other MO definitions], except for the definition of Deshpandé et al. have a clear action 
component, i.e., being responsive to customers”. On the other hand, regarding Narver and Slater’s 
(Narver & Slater, 1990; Slater & Narver, 1994) research, Homburg and Pflesser’s (2000) notion is 
inherently accurate, as Narver and Slater’s (1990) very definition of MO is based on behavioral com-
ponents. The relationship between the behavioral and the cultural perspective, as well as Homburg and 
Pflesser’s (2000) research will be further discussed later in this thesis. Consequently, to maintain co-
herent structure I will priorly discuss the behavioral MO perspective in the next subchapter. 
 
3.2 Behavioral perspective  
 
The behavioral MO research stream holds MO as a set of actions or processes that are in line with the 
business philosophy of marketing concept (Kirca et al., 2005). In many of the behavioral research 
stream’s definitions of MO, the action component of generating market or customer intelligence is 
present (eg. Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Shapiro, 1988; Ruekert, 1992). After the subsidence of the equiv-
ocal state present in most emergences of new research streams, most of the behavioral stream’s re-
search has accepted Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) definition of MO; “the organisationwide generation 
of market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the intelli-
gence across departments, and organisationwide responsiveness to it” (p. 6) (Raaij & Stoelhorst, 2008). 
According Kohli and Jaworski (1990) this definition avails the conceptualization of the marketing 
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concept, as it centered upon “[…] activities rather than philosophical notions” (p. 6). Next, I will ex-
plain in detail the above mentioned three components.  
 
Truly market oriented companies should not limit their market intelligence gathering only on current 
customer needs, but also on the fluctuations of the external forces affecting those needs, such as chang-
ing regulations and the actions of competitors (e.g. pricing) or customers’ customers (Kohli & Jawor-
ski, 1990). Understanding the whole market environment in this larger sense, will also help the com-
panies to be better able to forecast the future needs of their customers. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) also 
suggest a range of tools which enable this kind of information generation, such as sales report analysis, 
test markets, and customer database analysis. Despite the years between the paper’s publication and 
present day, many of the tools are still relevant, just perhaps in more “digitalized” form. In addition, 
the Kohli and Jaworski (1990) highlight that these tools should be used widely – solely relying on 
customer surveys won’t suffice.  
   
In order for the market intelligence to be beneficial, it also has be accessible for the relevant stake-
holders. However, all of the beneficial intelligence is not always created at the function which would 
benefit of or need the intelligence the most (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). As a solution, Kohli and Jawor-
ski (1990) propose that companies should facilitate proper formal and informal communication (and 
even internal sales) channels to ensure the efficient dissemination of market intelligence.  
 
Lastly, Kohli and Jaworski (1990) state that not much is gained if the intelligence is first generated, 
then disseminated effectively, but never acted upon. These actions which respond to market intelli-
gence touch organizations across functions, as the business examples collected by Kohli and Jaworski 
(1990) suggest; market selection, product design, promotion, and distribution. 
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Similar to the first and third element of Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) definition, Ruekert’s (1992) re-
search on the development MO emphasizes the importance of market intelligence generation and use. 
However Ruekert (1992) also takes a more strategical point of view on MO by also incorporating the 
development and implementation of a customer needs fulfilling strategy to his notion of MO. Moreo-
ver, Ruekert (1992) holds three organizational systems: recruiting, training, and compensation as key 
processes to the development of successful market oriented strategies. 
Also Shapiro’s (1988) research places highlight on processes – on decision making processes. In his 
view, market oriented companies do not only co-ordinate their actions across functions well, but also 
practice integrated decision making, which enables better organizational commitment as the actors 
implementing the plan were also making the plan. Naturally, as with the MO research in general, 
Shapiro (1988) also acknowledges the need for market intelligence generation and distribution.  
 
In the next chapter I will discuss the relationship and confluences between the cultural and behavioral 
MO approaches in order to establish a more unambiguous gestalt. This will alleviate the inspection of 
MO’s role in the process of defending against DIs 
 
3.3 Synthesis of perspectives 
 
Although different, the behavioral and the cultural approaches to MO have a lot in common. This can 
already be perceived when comparing all the notions of MO covered in the last three chapters. For 
example, the focus on customer is highlighted across all views, as well as the importance of intelli-
gence generation, whether it be explicitly stated to be of customers, markets, competitors, or a mixture 
of these, as in the end, they all denote the same. Additional points of shared agreement among most of 
the MO research are also the interfunctional coordination and action taking (Lafferty & Hult, 2001).  
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To discuss the interplays of the perspectives further, Griffiths and Grover’s (1998) research opens a 
new venue for discussion. According to them, the two perspectives are not only similar, but compati-
ble, as MO behaviors are the function or product of a MO culture (Griffiths and Grover, 1998). The 
authors reason that if MO behaviors are allowed to be carried out and form patterns, will they also 
ultimately increase the MO of an organization’s culture. Respectively, if an organization’s culture’s 
MO is increased, also more MO behaviors will follow (Griffiths and Grover, 1998). However, behav-
iors are not the only factor influencing the culture, as also forces such as underlying rules (organiza-
tional cognition), heroes and customs (organizational symbolism), system of beliefs imported (organ-
izational membership), and key policies (psychodynamic/ structural changes) play a role (Griffiths and 
Grover, 1998). It is worth noting, that even though Griffiths and Grover’s (1998) paper follows intui-
tive rationale, the authors’ propositions are based solely on their own deduction and existing literature, 
and are not verified by quantitative means. 
 
On the other hand, verging on Griffiths and Grover’s (1998) research, Homburg & Pflesser’s (2000) 
paper introduces a very similar idea of MO behaviors being the product of MO culture, but with the 
distinction that MO behaviors are incorporated in the MO culture, and are not a separate construct, as 
Griffiths and Grover (1998) propose. Homburg and Pflesser (2000) illustrate their model in an 
encompassing framework (see Fig. 3 below) which integrates the whole MO construct from both, the 
behavioral and the cultural perspectives by taking into account multiple the multiple layers of 
organizational culture: shared basic values, behavioral norms, artifacts, and behaviors. Shared basic 
values represent the general set of underlying shared “guidelines” of modes, means and behavior, while 
norms are similar, but more focused and behavioural context-bound (Homburg & Pflesser, 2000). In 
turn, artifacts, such as jargon or stories, are the embodiement of culture and they, along with 
behavioural norms, ultimately affect the behaviours (Homburg & Pflesser, 2000). The authors’ 
research is especially significant because of two reasons: first, it is the first in it’s field (MO) to 
22 
 
introduce artifacts as cultural factors, and second, because they succeeded in validating their 
integrative construct quantatively (Homburg & Pflesser, 2000).  
Fig. 3 From “A Multiple-Layer Model of Market-Oriented Organizational Culture: Measurement Is-
sues and Performance Outcomes” (Homburg & Pflesser, 2000) 
 
In conclusion, it can be deduced that the cultural understanding of MO is essential when the objective 
is to learn and examine more widely the different mechanisms which, in most circumstances, create 
the certain behaviors in a company. Such a situation could for example be when a manager seeks to 
improve the MO of his or her business. On the other hand, in situations which require measurement 
and weighing of the outcomes of the culture, one should focus on examining the behaviors.  
 
In the following chapter I will analyze of the potential effects of MO on incumbent firms’ defense 
capabilities against DIs and formulate the core propositions of this thesis.  
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4. Market Orientation & defending against Disruptive Innova-
tions 
 
In a research paper published in 1996, Christensen and Bower listed very much the same idea about 
DIs they had already presented in their seminal paper a year before (Bower & Christensen, 1995), but 
with the exception of stronger emphasis on their conclusion that listening to customers too carefully 
was the primary reason for incumbent failure. Christensen and Bower had clearly understood the con-
cept of listening to customer too narrowly - a matter to which Slater and Narver (1998) took response 
by articulating the difference between customer-led (focus on current customer needs and short term) 
and market oriented (focus on both current and latent customer needs and long term) businesses. It is 
noteworthy that this academic discussion took place on the pages of Strategic Management Journal 
and not in a more traditional marketing research publication. Also, in a subsequent debate on the jour-
nal of product innovation management, Danneels (2006) places doubts on Christensen’s literacy re-
garding marketing concepts and expresses a wish for a more genuine approach to cross-disciplinary 
research on the field of DI.  
 
Following Danneels’ (2006) wish, in the next four sections I will synthesize innovation management, 
management practice, and MO literature by cross analyzing the incumbent’s four defensive action 
points against DIs with the MO construct. The MO construct encompasses either, both, or the combi-
nation of the MARKOR (Kohli et. al., 1993, see appendix 1) and the MKTOR (Narver & Slater, 1990, 
see appendix 2) scales, as most of the research on the MO stream is based on similar settings (Raaij & 
Stoelhorst 2008). This choice is justified as the inclusion of both scales enables the consideration of 
behavioral as well as the cultural MO research streams’ views. Additionally, MARKOR and MKTOR 
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correlate highly (Deshpandé & Farley, 1998) and the thesis at hand does not include data collection, 
ergo there is little reason for the truncation of the construct.  
 
4.1 Recognizing potential disruptions 
 
As stated in a previous chapter of this thesis – 2.2, defending against DIs, disruptions are generally 
either customer (underserved needs) or competitor induced (ability to awaken new needs) (Paap & 
Katz, 2004).  Various components of MO (i.e. customer orientation, competitor orientation market 
intelligence generation) imply an intuitive link between MO and the recognition of these potential 
disruptions. This link is also supported by Kirca et. al (2005): “[MO] provides a firm with market-
sensing and customer-linking capabilities […]” (p. 25) as well as Kumar et. al. (2011): “[MO provides] 
both information on customers’ implicit and expressed needs and competitors’ strengths […]” (p. 19).  
 
However, as misunderstandings such as the earlier mentioned Christensen’s (1996) narrow under-
standing of “listening to the customer” happened, several new terms, such as proactive market orien-
tation (Narver, Slater, MacLachlan, 2004), second order marketing competence (Danneels, 2006), 
emerging customer orientation (Govindarajan, Kopalle, & Danneels, 2011), were formed to describe 
and highlight further the aspect of MO which concentrated on finding out the latent, potential, long 
term needs of customers. It was also discovered, that these aspects could simultaneously co-exist in a 
same company (or business unit) with the more responsive, current customer needs-focusing, aspects 
of MO (e.g. Govindarajan et. al., 2011). 
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Moreover, Slater and Narver (2000) define the market-focused intelligence creation to consist of (1) 
improvement of customer satisfaction, (2) tracking competitors, (3) investing in new market oppor-
tunity identification and understanding, (4) endeavors to find “news ways of looking at customers and 
their needs” (p. 126), and (5) systematic customer need information collection.  
 
Taking into account the “encroaching” nature of DIs, it can be concluded from the MO literature that 
participation in the proactive MO behaviors will very likely have a positive effect on the recognition 
of potential disruptions, whereas participation only in the reactive, customer-led orientation would 
carry neutral or negative implications. However, as the focus on potential, emerging customer needs 
and competition is already inbuilt in first definitions of MO (see e.g. Narver & Slater, 1990), it can be 
directly deducted that MO has a positive effect on the recognition of potential disruptions.  
 
4.2 Response strategy formulation 
 
Despite an extensive multi-disciplinary literature review no direct link between increased quality in 
response strategy formulation and MO could be established. The reason behind the disconnectedness 
might lie in the case-by-case-nature of strategy formulation – every encounter between a business and 
a DI forms a unique set of different influencing factors. 
 
Some indirect effects can however be distinguished. For example, MO has been proven to have a 
strongly positive effect on innovation capability (Huhtala et. al., 2014) and increased innovation capa-
bility in turn could help companies to invent better strategies. Another potential route of impact could 
also be the increased amount of viable response options discovered as a result of enhanced information 
gathering inherent in MO organizations. 
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The above mentioned suggestions are nonetheless dubious and could not be verified by existing liter-
ature. In conclusion, MO does not have an effect on the quality of response strategy formulation.  
 
4.3 Response strategy implementation 
 
Even if a link between response strategy formulation and MO couldn’t be established, could there be 
a connection between MO and strategy implementation? According to a research by Homburg, 
Krohmer, and Workman (2004), which brings novel empirical evidence on the effects of intangible 
organizational variables to strategy implementation, there is. The researchers discovered that MO has 
an important (positive) mediating role between strategy and performance and suggest that managers’ 
shouldn’t overlook a strategy’s implementation as strategies, per se, do not offer performance (Hom-
burg et. al, 2004).  
 
Also Ruekert (1992) found support for the same phenomenon, as in his research, the level of MO in 
the implementation of a business unit was the best indicator of performance. One reason behind better 
implementation of strategies by MO businesses could be that they are capable of linking their structures 
and behaviors with their chosen strategy better than others (Olson et. al., 2005).  
 
Thus, MO could only have a negative effect on a given strategy’s implementation if it would steer 
towards anti-MO behaviors. However, as most of the strategies’ ultimate goal is to capture the loyalty 
of the emerging customers the choice of such strategy in a sanely functioning business seems highly 
unlikely. Consequently, the MO literature suggests that MO has a positive effect on response strategy 
implementation. 
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4.4 Innovativeness 
 
The effect of MO to innovation capability has been widely studied and empirically proven as positive 
(for an overview see Liao et. al., 2011). In fact, innovativeness has been found to be an important 
mediating factor between MO and firm performance (Kirca et. al, 2005; Huhtala et. al., 2014).  
 
Even different types of innovations and MO’s impact on them has been researched. In their paper 
Govindarajan et. al. (2011) report that mainstream customer orientation supports companies endeavors 
to develop radical innovations, but inhabits their ability to introduce DIs. On the other hand emerging 
customer orientation has a positive effect on the development of DIs, and a neutral relationship to 
radical innovations (Govindarajan et. al. (2011). It is also worthwhile to remember, that these two 
customer orientations did not correlate with each other, which means they can exist simultaneously in 
an organization.   
 
In addition, many of MO’s characteristics listed on the recognizing potential disruptions –chapter  also 
effect a firm’s innovation capability positively, as MO improves innovation capability by enabling 
businesses to uncover both expressed and latent customer needs (Narver et al., 2004; Kumar et. al., 
2011). For example, technology scanning was in found to affect radical innovation capability posi-
tively in a study by Govindrajan et. al. (2011).  
 
Due to the existing literature’s homogenous stance on MO’s strengthening impact to firm innovative-
ness, it can be drawn that MO has a positive effect on a company’s ability to innovate.  
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4.5 Core propositions 
Based on the previous four sections, the core propositions of this thesis are depicted below (Fig. 4): 
Fig. 4 The effect of Market Orientation on Incumbent defense capability against Disruptive Innova-
tions. Self formulated. 
P1: Market Orientation has a positive effect on the recognition of potential disruptions. 
P2: Market Orientation has no effect on the disruption response strategy formulation. 
P3: Market Orientation has a positive effect on disruption response strategy implementation. 
P4: Market Orientation has a positive effect on a firm’s innovation abilities. 
 
A positive link could be established between MO and three out of the four components required for 
successful defense against DIs. The existing literature from the research streams of MO, innovation 
management, and marketing practice therefore implies that MO can strengthen an incumbents defense 
capabilities against DIs, thus decreasing its chances of being disrupted. The implications of these find-
ings will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
In the opening section of this thesis, two distinct research gaps as well as several managerial question 
marks were noted to exist at the crossroad of MO and DI research. Based on these blind spots, four 
29 
 
research questions were formed. The purpose of this section is to discuss the findings of the literature 
review and the succeeding qualitative meta-analysis that followed in relation to the previously stated 
research gaps and research questions. Theoretical implications will be addressed first, after which I 
will discuss the practical implications. 
 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
 
MO has been researched extensively since 1990, and especially its relationship with performance and 
innovativeness has gained a lot of academic attention (Liao et. al., 2011). Also the concept of DI, the 
capability to predict DIs, as well as how to enable DIs have been studied considerably (Yu & Hang, 
2010). There even exists research focusing on the effects of MO on (disruptive) innovation (e.g. 
Huhtala et. al., 2014; Govindarajan et. al., 2011), but these studies have been invariably conducted 
from the innovator’s point of view. 
 
Moreover, research from the DI perspective has distinguished a point of confluence with marketing, 
especially with the customer orientation (Yu & Hang, 2010). The need for more, truly cross-discipli-
nary research from the field of marketing (Danneels, 2004; 2006) was also noted. 
 
Thus, the implications of the thesis at hand are twofold. First, the findings contribute to MO literature 
as the beneficial performance effects of MO can be understood more broadly, now also including en-
hanced defending capabilities against disruptions. This benefit is ought to be of increasing importance 
in the today’s ever-complexing competitive environment (Paap & Katz, 2004). Moreover, the findings 
also address a new area regarding MO: Incumbent response to DIs. Second, in the research streams of 
DI and management practice, the findings help to broaden the perspective of disruption responding to 
30 
 
also consider such variables as potential disruptor recognition and strategy implementation. Conse-
quently, perhaps also marketing’s (or MO’s) company-wide role will also be better understood amid 
these fields of research.  
 
5.2. Practical implications 
 
Although the findings of this thesis are preliminary, they still provide some interesting conclusions for 
practitioners. First, as the link between MO and enhanced defense capabilities against DIs has been 
initially proven, managers are able to weigh the benefits of engaging in MO activates or culture more 
accurately. 
 
Second, the findings further highlight the importance of proactive MO beside the reactive, or main-
stream MO (Narver et. al., 2004). For example the benefits mentioned above cannot be reaped without 
actively seeking different way to find and fulfill customers’ latent needs. Engaging in only reactive 
MO may even prove harmful. Thus practitioners should seek to establish the needed cultures, struc-
tures and processes to incentivize such behavior, have they not already done so. 
 
Third, the results of the innovation management literature review showcases a broader framework for 
addressing the DI threat, providing managers with additional straightforward action points in addition 
to response strategy selection. 
In the next and last section in the body of this thesis I will summarize the thesis’ key findings, discuss 
the limitations, as well as suggest possible areas for future research.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
In the beginning of this thesis, I introduced the need for further research on the crossroads of the 
research streams of MO and DI. Subsequently, I presented the definition of DI as well as the critique 
and expansions regarding the concept (e.g Markides, 2006; Schmidt and Druehl, 2008). It became 
apparent, that Christensen’s DI theory (Christensen et. al., 2015) is not meant to be bullet-proof, but 
rather to act as a tool for better understanding of certain types of innovations and market events. After 
the introduction of DI, I followed to review the field’s research in order to formulate a set of required 
actions for successful defense against DI, as no model previously existed to suit that task. The compo-
nents of this set are: (1) early recognition of potential disruptions, (2) response strategy formulation, 
(3) response strategy implementation, (4) innovation ability.  
 
Next, I shifted to introduce MO and its two main perspectives, the behavioral perspective (Kohli & 
Jaworski, 1990) and the cultural perspective (Narver & Slater, 1990). Additionally, I discovered that 
these two perspectives are very similar, even complementary, and presented a synthetization of the 
concepts using Homburg and Pflesser’s (2000) Multiple-Layer Model.  
 
Finally, I cross analyzed relevant MO literature with the four different components effecting incum-
bent’s defense against DIs and found evidence for a positive link between MO and (1) early recognition 
of disruptions, (3) response strategy implementation, and (4) innovation ability. Following this, the 
implications for theory as well as for practice were discussed. 
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6.1 Limitations and scope of research 
 
The main and only methods of this thesis are literature review and qualitative meta-analysis, which 
means the findings of the analysis are not directly verified empirically. Additionally, the research fo-
cuses only on MO and its relationship to another concept, DI, MO is no compared with other competing 
orientations. Respectively, DIs are a special, precisely defined category of innovations, meaning that 
the findings are not necessarily transferrable suit other types of innovations. 
 
6.2 Possible areas for future research 
 
One very clear and potential area for future research would be the empirical verification and validation 
of the core propositions of this thesis. Regarding this, also the validity and relevance of the incumbent 
defense capability construct should be tested.  
 
A second interesting venue for further research would be the unestablished link of MO and (DI re-
sponse) strategy formulation. There seemed to be some potential indirect paths for MO’s impact to 
these, but I personally did not come across them when review the literature.  
 
In addition, research on the penetration of the proactive or second-grade MO among different compa-
nies would be very beneficial, as many of the positive and beneficial effects of MO are exactly con-
nected to this approach of MO (e.g. Danneels, 2006; Narver et. al, 2004; Govindarajan et. al. 2011). 
Yet it also clear, that this type of MO is harder to achieve than mainstream MO, bringing forth the 
question of its distribution. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1.  
Scale of Market Orientation (MARKOR) by Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993) (p. 66) 
(5-point scale, in which 5 = strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree). 
A 20-item scale consisting of three subconstructs. 
 
Intelligence Generation  
1. In this business unit, we meet with customers at least once a year to find out what products or 
sevices they will need in the future.  
2. In this business unit, we do a lot of in-house market research.  
3. We are slow to detect changes in our customers' product preferences 
4. We poll end users at least once a year to assess the quality of our products and services. 
5. We are slow to detect fundamental shifts in our industry (e.g., competition, technology, regu-
lation). 
6. We periodically review the likely effect of changes in our business envi-ronment (e.g., regula-
tion) on customers. 
 
Intelligence Dissemination 
7. We have interdepartmental meetings at least once a quarter to discuss mar-ket trends and de-
velopments. 
8. Marketing personnel in our business unit spend time discussing customers' future needs with 
other functional departments. 
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9. When something important happens to a major customer of market, the whole business unit 
knows about it within a short period. 
10. Data on customer satisfaction are disseminated at all levels in this business unit on a regular 
basis. 
11. When one department finds out something important about competitors, it is slow to alert other 
departments. 
 
Responsiveness to Market Intelligence 
12. It takes us forever to decide how to respond to our competitor's price changes. 
13. For one reason or another we tend to ignore changes in our customer's product or service needs. 
14. We periodically review our product development efforts to ensure that they are in line with 
what customers want. 
15. Several departments get together periodically to plan a response to changes taking place in our 
business environment. 
16. If a major competitor were to launch an intensive campaign targeted at our customers, we 
would implement a response immediately. 
17. The activities of the different departments in this business unit are well coordinated. 
18. Customer complaints fall on deaf ears in this business unit. 
19. Even if we came up with a great marketing plan, we probably would not be able to implement 
it in a timely fashion. 
20. When we find that customers would like us to modify a product of service, the departments 
involved make concerted efforts to do so. 
 
Appendix 2. 
Scale of Market Orientation (MKTOR) synthesized from Narver and Slater (1990) (p. 24) & Desh-
pandé and Farley (1998) (p. 226-227) 
(7-point scale, in which 7 = To an extreme extent and 1 = Not at all). 
A 15-item scale consisting of three subconstructs. 
Customer Orientation 
1. We constantly monitor our level of commitment and orientation to serving customer needs 
2. Our business strategies are driven by our beliefs about how we can create greater value for our 
customers 
3. Our strategy for competitive advantage is based on our understanding of customer’s needs 
4. Our business objectives are driven primarily by customer satisfaction 
5. We measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently 
6. We give close attention to after-sales service 
 
Competitor Orientation 
7. Our salespeople regularly share information within our business concerning competitors’ strat-
egies. 
8. We rapidly respond to competitive actions that threaten us. 
9. Top managers regularly discusses competitors' strengths and strategies 
10. We target customers where we have an opportunity for competitive advantage 
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Interfunctional Coordination 
11. Our top managers from every functions regularly visit our current and prospective customers 
12. We freely communicate information about our successful and unsuccessful customer experi-
ences across all business functions 
13. All of our business functions (e.g., marketing/sales, manufacturing, R&D, finance/accounting, 
etc.) are integrated in serving the needs of our target markets. 
14. All of our managers understand how everyone in our business can contribute to customer value 
15. We share resources with other business units 
 
Appendix 3.  
The Encroachment terminology by Schmidt and Druehl (2008) (p. 348). 
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Appendix 4.  
How to Respond to Disruptive Strategic Innovation by Charitou and Markides (2002) (p. 62) 
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Appendix 5.  
An analysis of active innovation defenses by Arend (2009) (p. 197) 
 
 
 
